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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To investigate opposition to standardised
tobacco packaging in the UK. To increase understanding
of how transnational corporations are adapting to
changes in their access to policymakers precipitated by
Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC).
Design: Case study web-based documentary analysis,
using NVivo V.10. Examination of relationships between
opponents of standardised packaging and transnational
tobacco companies (TTCs) and of the volume, nature,
transparency and timing of their activities.
Setting: UK standardised packaging policy debate
2011–2013.
Participants: Organisations selected on basis of
opposition to, or facilitation thereof, standardised
tobacco packaging in the UK; 422 associated
documents.
Results: Excluding tobacco manufacturing and
packaging companies (n=12), 109 organisations were
involved in opposing standardised packaging, 82 (75%)
of which had a financial relationship with 1 or more
TTC. These 82 organisations (43 actively opposing the
measure, 39 facilitating opposition) were responsible for
60% of the 404 activities identified, including the
majority of public communications and research
production. TTCs were directly responsible for 28% of
total activities, predominantly direct lobbying, but also
financially underwrote third party research,
communication, mass recruitment and lobbying. Active
organisations rarely reported any financial relationship
with TTCs when undertaking opposition activities.
Conclusions: The multifaceted opposition to
standardised packaging was primarily undertaken by
third parties with financial relationships with major
tobacco manufacturers. Low levels of transparency
regarding these links created a misleading impression
of diverse and widespread opposition. Countries should
strengthen implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC by
systematically requiring conflict of interest declarations
from all organisations participating in political or media
debates on tobacco control.
INTRODUCTION
On National No Smoking Day, 11 March
2015, over 6 years after it was ﬁrst proposed1
and following its inclusion in numerous
policy initiatives,2–4 the UK House of
Commons voted to introduce standardised
packaging for tobacco products (see online
supplementary ﬁle 1).5 6 In jurisdictions with
advertising7–9 and point of sale display restric-
tions,10–13 packaging is (alongside product
design) one of transnational tobacco com-
panies’ (TTCs) few remaining forms of brand
marketing and identity.14–17 By prohibiting
logos, brand imagery and promotional text,
standardised packaging aims to reduce the
appeal of tobacco products and increase
the effectiveness of health warnings.18–25
Academic and government reviews of the evi-
dence have concluded that the policy is likely
to reduce youth smoking uptake.18 26–34
Standardised packaging is the second
major policy restricting tobacco companies’
commercial activities (the ﬁrst being the
Point of Sale Display Ban) to be proposed in
the UK following the introduction of both
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This paper is the first study to systematically
examine the scale and nature of opposition to
standardised tobacco packaging outside
Australia.
▪ While tobacco industry document research has
been used extensively to examine the historical
political activity of corporations, this study
employs an innovative combination of publicly
available sources and investigative research tech-
niques to analyse corporate political action in
contemporary health policy conflicts.
▪ The study presents a novel classification system
for systematically examining the sector and rela-
tionships of ostensibly distinct organisations
opposing public health policy which can be
applied in other settings.
▪ The ongoing nature of the conflict during the
study period restricted the study to examining
political activity, rather than influence.
▪ Further research using social network and social
media analysis would provide deeper insights
into how protobacco policy networks are formed
and operate.
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restrictions on tobacco industry political activity under
Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC)2 35 36 and policy instruments associated
with the Better Regulation agenda.37–40
Article 5.3 of the FCTC requires governments to
‘protect’ tobacco control policies ‘from commercial and
other vested interests of the tobacco industry’.35 36 In
order to meet this requirement, the UK Government
committed to placing signiﬁcant restrictions on tobacco
companies’ capacity to use ‘insider’ political strategies,
such as direct lobbying, to inﬂuence tobacco policy.41 42
Insider strategies are characterised by a close relation-
ship with policy élites and are based on exchange of
information and mutual trust and support.42 In response
to Article 5.3, the government undertook to publish the
details of all policy-related meetings between the
tobacco industry and government departments and to
require organisations engaging with the Department of
Health on tobacco control to disclose any relevant rela-
tionship with the industry.3 These changes work to for-
malise tobacco manufacturers’ status as political
‘outsiders’.4 5
In contrast, reforms under the Better Regulation
agenda require that all new policy proposals undergo both
stakeholder consultation and impact assessment, for which
submissions and data from industry are speciﬁcally
invited.43–46 This creates a new, highly accessible, evidence-
focused policymaking venue, into which business and civil
society actors can feed information.40 43 47 48
This study is the ﬁrst to explore how major tobacco
manufacturers are negotiating this new institutional
context in the UK. It is also the ﬁrst European study to
examine their political action in response to standar-
dised tobacco packaging proposals, a policy which was
ﬁrst implemented in Australia in 2012 and is being
taken up by other jurisdictions (eg, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Sweden,
Canada and New Zealand). Using an innovative
approach to tobacco industry research, the study ana-
lyses publicly available sources to explore contemporary,
rather than historical,49 political activity. It aims to iden-
tify relationships between TTCs and those opposing stan-
dardised packaging and to examine the volume and
nature (type and range) of activities undertaken by them
to oppose the policy in the UK between 2011 and 2013.
It further explores the transparency of opposition organi-
sations’ relationships with TTCs and assesses the timing
of their activities vis-à-vis key events in the policy process.
METHODS
Data collection and recording
In 2012, the Department of Health held a 4-month con-
sultation (April to August) on standardised packaging
for tobacco products. This attracted the largest ever
response to a public consultation in the UK, and fea-
tured both strong opposition to and signiﬁcant support
for the measure (see online supplementary ﬁle 1).3 The
study mapped opposition to standardised packaging
during the 3-year period (1 January 2011–31 December
2013) straddling the consultation.50 51 Data collection
began in January 2013 and was prospective and retro-
spective. Using snowball sampling, data were predomin-
antly collected from online sources, accessed via search
engines and organisational website search functions. To
facilitate this approach, web monitoring was employed,
using both ‘ASH Daily News’ and daily search engine
alerts for key words: packaging, plain, tobacco, cigarette, UK.
Data were also gathered from freedom of information
(FOI) requests made to the Department of Health,
Intellectual Property Ofﬁce and the Treasury. These
requests asked for ‘meetings, meeting notes, agendas,
records of telephone conversations, or email or written
correspondence with or from tobacco companies, lobby
groups (eg, retail, business, trademarks) and/or think
tanks where standardised or plain packaging of tobacco
products was mentioned/discussed’ specifying dates rele-
vant to the study timeframe. Semistructured interviews
(between 45 and 60 min) were conducted with seven
public health advocates to obtain background informa-
tion and source further data. The study was also
informed by leaked documents from Philip Morris
International (PMI).52 53 Written consent was provided
by all interviewees.
Four hundred and twenty-two data items (including
letters, videos, web articles and news items, press releases,
adverts, reports) were identiﬁed. Data were imported into
NVivo V.10 and recorded in a classiﬁcation spreadsheet.
The sample excluded blog posts, social media entries, cor-
respondence sent in response to requests or enquiries
from government departments, and consultation submis-
sions (including associated cover letters), the latter having
been analysed at length in other studies.54–56
Data coding
Data were coded for actor characteristics and political
activity themes (table 1). In terms of inclusion criteria,
‘actors’ were deﬁned as companies, organisations and
groups whom the data showed undertook political activ-
ity to oppose, or to facilitate opposition to, standardised
packaging. They were classiﬁed according to their role
(identiﬁed from data), sector (identiﬁed from data and
actors’ websites) and relationship with major tobacco com-
panies. Relationship was identiﬁed using a four step
process: (1) data; (2) actors’ websites, transparency regis-
ters and databases; (3) general web searches combining
organisation names with TTC names; and (4) email
enquiries.54 Political activities were coded deductively
using themes based on Savell et al.57 The transparency of
TTC involvement in activities was also coded from the
data (table 1). All data were coded by JLH and discussed
and agreed iteratively with GJF. Triangulation, prolonged
engagement with the context, persistent observation of
the data and peer debrieﬁng were employed to ensure
the validity of ﬁndings.59
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Analysis
First, we examined the data for number of organisations
involved, their role in the conﬂict, their sector and their
relationship with TTCs. Second, the volume, type,
nature, timing and transparency of the different political
activities undertaken by each actor were systematically
quantiﬁed. This information was used to understand the
pattern of activity by sector and relationship with TTCs.
Third, interpretive qualitative analysis was used to obtain
a deeper understanding of the purpose of the different
types of activities identiﬁed.
RESULTS
Organisations opposing standardised packaging and their
relationships with TTCs
One hundred and twenty-one organisations were identi-
ﬁed as opposing standardised packaging within the
study period (table 2). Of these, 78/121 (64.5%) actively
Table 1 Classification system for participants and their activity in the conflict
Classification of actors
Role—determined from data
Active participants Actors who opposed standardised packaging in public, business and/or political venues
Facilitative participants Actors who did not oppose standardise packaging on their own behalf, but undertook
research or other consultative work for active participants that was subsequently used by the
active participants, for example, to develop and substantiate arguments and disseminate
them for public and political audiences
Sector—determined from data and actors’ websites
Academia Universities
Business Tobacco product and tobacco packaging manufacturing and tobacco packaging design
companies
Non-manufacturing companies
General and sectoral business associations
Civil society Think tanks
General and smokers’ rights groups
Labour unions
Retired police associations
State Parliamentary groups
Relationship with tobacco companies—determined from data, actors’ websites, transparency registers, general internet
searches and email enquiries54
Financial Core funding from one or more TTC
Campaign funding from one or more TTC
Membership funding or donation from one or more TTC
Client relationships with one or more TTC
Non-financial Employee membership (where TTC employees were members of organisations)
Third party connections (where an indirect link exists between the actor and a TTC via a
third party)
None No relationship between the actor and any of the four major tobacco companies
Unknown Insufficient information to determine whether a relationship existed
Manufacturers Tobacco product and packaging manufacturing companies were exempt from classification
for relationship
Classification of political activity
Type of political activity
Research production The commissioning and production of policy-relevant research
Public communication Public communication of arguments to the general public and to sectoral audiences
(eg, retailers, smokers) via the mainstream and sectoral media, including press, online,
films, events
Mass recruitment Mass recruitment of the general public and of particular sectors to encourage responses to
the 2012 consultation and communication with MPs and Ministers
Direct lobbying Direct lobbying of politicians and civil servants via hospitality, meetings, events and
publications and correspondence
Transparency of involvement of TTCs in political activity
Explicit Clear declaration of TTCs funding or involvement in activity-related documents
Implicit Activity-related documents did not include a declaration of TTC funding, but one could be
found on the publishing website
Undeclared Neither documents nor publishing website included a declaration of TTC funding
Not applicable No evidence of TTC involvement in political activity
MPs, Members of Parliament; TTC, transnational tobacco company.
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Table 2 Number, sector, role and relationships with TTCs of organisations (n=121) opposing standardised packaging of tobacco products UK 2011–2013
Category Sector
Total number
of (%)
organisations
per category,
n=121
Roles Relationships with TTCs, n=109* Political activity, n=404
Number of
active
organisations
Number of
facilitative
organisations
Number of (%)
financial
relationships
with tobacco
companies58
Number of (%)
non-financial
relationships
with tobacco
companies
Number of
(%) no
relationship
with tobacco
companies
identified Research
Public
communication
Mass
recruitment
Direct
lobbying
Business
(tobacco)
Tobacco
manufacturers
12 (10) 4 0 NA NA NA 1/C 22/C 1/C 90/C
Packaging and
design
companies
8 0 NA NA NA – – 4 7
Business
(other)
Investment
banks
35 (29) 1 0 0 (0) 1 (100) 0 1 – – –
Media
companies
2 0 1 (50) 1 (50) 0 – 3 1 2
Law firms† 1 5 5 (83) 1 (17) 0 4 2 – 5
Public relations
companies†
1 6 7 (100) 0 0 – 2/C C 3
Research
consultancies†
1 18 17 (89) 2 (11) 0 31 4 – –
Business
associations
Manufacturing 35 (29) 2 0 2 (100) 0 0 – 5 – 3
Packaging 1 0 0 0 1 (100) – – 1 –
Wholesale 2 0 2 (100) 0 0 – 7 1 2
Retail 10 0 8 (80) 0 2 (20) –/C 45 4 7
General 9 0 9 (100) 0 0 – 1 – 4
Intellectual
property
11 0 8 (73) 1 (18) 2 (9) –/C 9 – 7
Civil society Think tanks 24 (20) 13 0 6 (46) 7 (54) 0 7 32 –/S 1
General rights
groups
5 0 2 (40) 2 (40) 1 (20) – 22 – 1
Smokers’ rights
groups
2 0 2 (100) 0 0 – 38 1 5
Unions
representing
tobacco
employees
2 0 0 2 (100) 0 – – 1 –
Retired police
groups
2 0 0 1 (50) 1 (50) –/C 1 – –
Academia Universities† 14 (11.6) 0 14 13 (93) 1 (7) 0 13 – – –
State Ad hoc
parliamentary
alliances
1 (<1) 1 0 0 1 (100) 0 – – – 3
Total 121 78 43 82 (75.2) 20 (18.4) 7 (6.4) 57 193 14 140
Political activity: sectors which did not undertake specific political activities.
*Excludes tobacco and packaging companies.
†Organisations commissioned to provide research, legal and public relations services to tobacco companies and other active organisations in the conflict.
C, commissioned or collaborated in activity; NA, not available; S, supported mass recruitment activities but did not initiate them; TTC, transnational tobacco company.
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opposed the policy (active participants). In total, 43/121
(35.5%) were facilitative participants who provided legal,
research and public relations services to active organisa-
tions, without directly opposing the policy on their own
account.
Only 12/121 (10%) were businesses from the tobacco
or tobacco packaging manufacturing sectors (table 2).
The remaining 109 organisations comprised: 35/121
(29%) non-manufacturing businesses; 35/121 (29%)
business associations; 24/121 (20%) civil society organi-
sations; 14/121 (11.6%) universities and 1/121 (<1%),
an ad hoc parliamentary alliance (table 2 and ﬁgure 1).
Of these 109 organisations, 82/109 (75.2%) had ﬁnan-
cial relationships58 and 20/109 (18.4%) non-ﬁnancial
relationships with at least one TTC (table 2 and
ﬁgure 1). The remaining 7/109 (6.4%) organisations
comprised one which was found to have no connection
with any tobacco company, and six which could not be
classiﬁed due to insufﬁcient information.
Ten of the organisations with ﬁnancial relationships
with TTCs were found to be in receipt of core and/or
antistandardised packaging campaign funding, 30 had
tobacco company members or had received tobacco
company donations, and 42 had tobacco company
clients. One hundred per cent of smokers’ rights
groups, public relations and lobbying ﬁrms,
manufacturing, wholesale and general business associa-
tions were found to have ﬁnancial relationships with
TTCs (table 2). Ninety per cent or more of universities,
and 80% or more of law ﬁrms, research consultancies
and retail associations identiﬁed in the research were
also ﬁnancially linked to TTCs. Of the 20 organisations
with non-ﬁnancial relationships, 17 were connected with
tobacco companies via a third party. For example, orga-
nisations were linked to TTCs via bridging actors
engaged in either neoliberal or business networks and
tobacco company-funded activity. Others were subcon-
tracted by organisations commissioned by tobacco com-
panies or had collaborated with tobacco company
consultants.54 Three included tobacco company employ-
ees among their members.
Opposition organisations’ political activity
Political activities were extensive (n=404, identiﬁed from
the 422 documents) and entailed four main types of
action: production of policy-relevant research (57, 14%);
public communication (193, 48%); mass recruitment
(14, 3%) and direct lobbying (140, 35%).
Different sectors focused on different types of activity
(table 2 and ﬁgure 2). TTCs (114/404, 28%) were par-
ticularly active in direct lobbying of government. Civil
society organisations (109/404, 27%) and business
Figure 1 Number, sector and relationship with TTCs of organisations opposing, or facilitating opposition to, standardised
packaging in the UK 2011–2013 (excludes tobacco manufacturing, packaging and design companies), n=109. PR, public
relations; TTC, transnational tobacco company.
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associations (96/404, 24%) prioritised public communi-
cations. Other companies (58/404, 14%), predomin-
antly comprising law and public relations ﬁrms, and
academic actors (13/404, 3%) mainly produced
research. Packaging and design ﬁrms undertook a small
number of mass recruitment and direct lobbying activ-
ities (11/404, 3%). State actors only undertook direct
lobbying (3/404, 1%).
The distribution of opposition activities also varied with
organisations’ relationships with TTCs (ﬁgure 3).
Figure 3 Distribution of types of political activity by relationship of organisations with TTCs, n=404. TTC, transnational tobacco
company.
Figure 2 Volume and distribution by sector of activities undertaken or cited to oppose standardised packaging 2011–13, n=404.
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Organisations ﬁnancially related to TTCs undertook the
majority (244/404, 60%) of all opposition activities,
including nearly 9 out of 10 research reports and three-
quarters of public communications. Organisations with
non-ﬁnancial relationships undertook all four activity
types (23/404, 6%; ﬁgure 3). The data reveal how
activities combined to form both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’
political strategies. For example, research produced by
third parties was frequently cited in lobbying activities and
business and civil society organisations were found to col-
laborate on public communications and mass recruitment
campaigns (table 3).
Table 3 Examples of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ activities undertaken by TTCs and opposition organisations
Political strategy type Political activities* Extracts
Insider strategy: research
production and direct
lobbying
PMI commission an opinion from Lord
Hoffman, which they and public relations
firm, Crosby Textor Fullbrook (retained by
PMI), promote to ministers and officials in
the Intellectual Property Office.60
“A prohibition on the use of a mark is in my view a
complete deprivation of the property in that mark,
notwithstanding that the proprietor might be able
to distinguish his goods by the use of some other
mark.”
Lord Hoffman, Philip Morris International: Opinion,
24.05.1261
“I will send you the Lord Hoffman opinion in the
near future as I’m sure it would be of interest to
you.”
Philip Morris Ltd email to the Intellectual Property
Office, Fw: Meeting follow up—21 June 2012—
Email 1 25.06.1262
“My dear Lord, please find enclosed as promised
a telling opinion from Lord Hoffman…Hoffman is
the most telling and concerning from an IP
viewpoint.”
Lynton Crosby, Crosby-Textor-Fullbrook, email to
Lord Marland, Minister for Intellectual Property,
01.11.1263
Outsider strategy: public
communication and mass
recruitment
BAT, ITG and JTI core-fund active
organisations (Forest, Hands Off Our Packs
(HOOPs)) who mobilise support from other
organisations to help promote their
antistandardised packaging messaging,
eventually generating nearly 270 000
antistandardised packaging signatures.3 64
“Angela Harbutt [head of HOOPs]… believed the
proposal was the most ill-conceived, idiotic and
illiberal idea that had come out of any UK
government during the past five or 10 years. She
said that it was a fight that had to be won, and
she asked those present to sign up to the
campaign and to spread the word.”
Forest on the HOOPs campaign launch,
27.02.1265
“When the government came to power, I don’t
remember them saying it was going to be a
priority for them to increase regulation and
persecute minority lifestyle choices. But that’s
what this consultation is about….So please sign
up to the HOOPs campaign and do everything
you can to stop this ridiculous new growth of the
nanny state.”
Mark Littlewood, Director, Institute of Economic
Affairs, in HOOPs’ campaign film, Nannytown,
07.03.1266
“It’s about time we called a halt to the advance of
the ‘nanny state’ and reasserted the historic
British values of tolerance and freedom.”
Andrew Turner, CEO, API Group (packaging),
interviewed by HOOPs, 01.05.1267
*For more information on these cases see http://www.tobaccotactics.org.
PMI, Philip Morris International; TTC, transnational tobacco company.
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Production of research
Nearly 9 of every 10 research reports (50/57, 88%) were
authored by organisations with a ﬁnancial relationship
with TTCs (ﬁgure 3). They presented similar arguments
to tobacco company consultation submissions, where
they were widely quoted,55 and to PMI’s antistandardised
packaging strategy (leaked to the public health non-
governmental organisation, Action on Smoking and
Health).52 53 These were: negative economic, illicit
trade, intellectual property and trade and price conse-
quences of standardised packaging; criticism of the
policy process; and lack of evidence of effect. The data
showed that commissioned research reports were used
by TTCs and ﬁnancially linked actors to support oppos-
ition arguments in public communication and direct
lobbying activities.
Public communications
Over three-quarters (150/193, 78%) of public communi-
cations were undertaken by 35 business associations, civil
society groups and a public relations ﬁrm with ﬁnancial
relationships with TTCs (ﬁgure 3). Public communica-
tions replicated TTCs’ main arguments against standar-
dised packaging, and disseminated them to general and
sectoral audiences. General audience communications
included press releases, ﬁlms raising the spectres of
illicit tobacco and the ‘nanny state’,66 68–72 advertise-
ments subsequently judged to be in breach of the
Advertising Standards Authority’s code73–77 and articles
in the mainstream media. Sectoral communications
included articles, news stories and events directed at spe-
ciﬁc groups, such as retailers and intellectual property
professionals.78–81 The combination of general and sec-
toral communications found in the data suggests that
TTCs, and other opponents of standardised packaging,
were cognisant of the power of different media to raise
the signiﬁcance of this policy among different constitu-
encies. Such communications may have contributed to
the intensity of the 2012 consultation response (see mass
recruitment) and indirectly to the period of seeming polit-
ical inactivity which followed.
Mass recruitment
Five mass recruitment campaigns were undertaken by
organisations ﬁnancially linked to TTCs and one by
Imperial Tobacco Group themselves (ﬁgure 3 and
table 4). Campaigns aimed to encourage the general
public and targeted constituencies to submit postcard,
standard letter or petition-style responses to the 2012
consultation and to lobby Members of Parliament (MPs)
and Ministers.3 52 53 Campaign materials were promoted
online, in the workplace and in the street and reﬂected
TTC arguments.83 85 86 The largest campaign, Hands
Off Our Packs, extended its reach by commissioning
street marketing in 30 UK cities87 and collaborating with
sympathetic organisations (table 3).66 88–92 The ﬁve mass
recruitment campaigns directly funded by TTCs gener-
ated 420 394/427 812 (98%) opposition campaign
submissions.3 Mass recruitment campaigns aimed to
translate opposition-oriented general and sectoral
opinion (underpinned by public communications) into
mass political action.
Direct lobbying of policymakers
Over a quarter (39/140, 28%) of direct lobbying was
undertaken by organisations ﬁnancially linked to TTCs
and nearly two-thirds (90/140, 64%) by TTCs themselves
(ﬁgure 3). Direct lobbying included: 32 hospitality gifts
valued at £32 583 from JTI;93 17 meetings with govern-
ment ofﬁcials at the Treasury, Department of Health and
Intellectual Property Ofﬁce;62 94–101 9 events, including
in Parliament on the illicit trade102–106 and party confer-
ences;107 108 publications in parliamentary maga-
zines;82 84 109 and 82 correspondence items sent mainly
to the Department of Health, the Treasury and the
Intellectual Property Ofﬁce.110–120 Correspondence
included letters from an ad hoc group of 50–74 MPs, 8 of
whom had previously accepted gifts from JTI.93 121–123
Direct lobbying activities drew on the range of arguments
promoted by TTCs, and ﬂagged or enclosed industry-
commissioned research reports (table 3).
Transparency of tobacco industry involvement in opposition
activities
Active organisations with ﬁnancial relationships with
TTCs (n=43) were transparent in only half of corres-
pondence (15/31, 48%), 1 of 4 research reports124 and
<1 in 5 public communications (27/150, 18%). For
example, in public communications former police ofﬁ-
cers did not declare membership of the Common Sense
Alliance (a FOREST offshoot).125–129
In contrast, TTCs (n=4) and facilitative actors with
ﬁnancial relationships with them (n=39) were transpar-
ent in reporting their interests. All but one research
reports (41/42, 98%) declared their source of funding,
although references to authorial independence, experi-
ence and qualiﬁcations were used to offset potential
negative effects of corporate funding on credibility.55 Yet,
when promoted by active participants in the conﬂict, TTC
funding of research was only acknowledged in 6/20
(30%) citations in press releases130–135 and in 4/35
(11%) citations in direct lobbying correspondence.136–139
Timing of political activity
Peaks in opposition political activity coincided with the
Australian public consultation (April to June 2011, when
JTI made 17 gifts to MPs), the UK public consultation
(April to August 2012), the Department of Health
announcement that they would ‘wait and see’ what evi-
dence emerged from Australia ( July 2013)3 140 and the
decision to establish the independent Chantler Review
of evidence on standardised packaging (November
2013) (ﬁgure 4 and see online supplementary ﬁle
1).26 141 Research publications peaked early in June
2012, midway through the consultation. Public commu-
nications dominated in the period leading into the
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Table 4 Mass recruitment campaigns to oppose standardised tobacco packaging, n=14
Actor information Mass recruitment campaign details
Category Sector Name Relationship Name of campaign
Tobacco
company
funding? Recruitment targets
Number of
submissions
Business
(tobacco)
Tobacco
manufacturers
Imperial Tobacco Direct
commercial
Say NO to plain packs ITG General public 120 247
Packaging and
design companies
Benkert Direct
commercial
(Unnamed) NA Packaging employees 131
Chesapeake Direct
commercial
Say ‘No’ to standardised
packaging
NA Packaging employees 79
Parkside Flexibles Direct
commercial
(Unnamed) NA Packaging employees 196
Weidenhammer Direct
commercial
(Unnamed) NA Packaging employees 869
Business
(other)
Media companies Asian Media and
Marketing Group
Financial (Unnamed) PMI, ITG82 Retailers 898
Business
associations
Packaging Unnamed packaging
employees group
Unknown (Unnamed) NA Packaging employees 175
Wholesale Scottish Wholesale
Association
Financial Plain Nonsense BAT, ITG83 84 Unknown 2865
Retail Association of
Independent
Tobacconists
Unknown (Unnamed) NA Specialist
tobacconists and
customers
3199
National Federation of
Retail Newsagents
Financial (Unnamed) NA Retailers 6
Tobacco Retailers’
Alliance
Financial No to ‘plain’ packs BAT, ITG, JTI Retailers 26 530
Unnamed retailers’
group
Unknown (Unnamed) NA Small retailers 561
Civil Society Smokers’ rights Hands Off Our Packs
and Forest
Financial Hands Off Our Packs BAT, ITG, JTI General Public 269 854
Unions Unite and GMB Non-financial Plain packaging of tobacco
products: Caution UK jobs
at risk
NA Tobacco, print and
packaging employees
2202
Total 427 812
Source: Department for Health.3 The figure 427 812 is at variance with that quoted in the Department of Health report (427 888) as it excludes 2 letters co-signed by 51 MPs and 25 former
policemen. These are included elsewhere in the analysis of political activity in the paper.
MPs, Members of Parliament; NA, not available.
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consultation and again when the Chantler Review was
announced. Direct lobbying occurred throughout but
was particularly prevalent in the period after the consult-
ation, when the government emphasised that it had an
‘open mind’.142–144
DISCUSSION
Nearly 9 of every 10 political activities undertaken to
oppose standardised packaging were ﬁnancially linked
to the tobacco industry. Eighty-two diverse third party
organisations with ﬁnancial relationships with TTCs58
undertook 60% of all opposition activity, including the
vast majority of research production (88%) and public
communications (78%). Active organisations among
them were rarely transparent about their relationship
with TTCs. TTCs undertook 28% of activities themselves,
including 64% of all direct lobbying. While previous
research has identiﬁed TTCs’ use of third parties,54 145
this is the ﬁrst paper to quantify the extent of
TTC-supported political activity. It shows that the major-
ity of activities undertaken to oppose standardised
tobacco packaging in the UK were linked to the tobacco
industry. The signiﬁcance of this for public health policy
debates should not be underestimated.
TTCs’ long-term and campaign-speciﬁc support for
third parties expanded the policy conﬂict146 147 in two
key respects. First, it increased the capacity of partici-
pants in the conﬂict to undertake opposition activities.
Second, it helped mobilise the support of a diverse
range of constituencies including the wholesale and
retail sectors—which the ofﬁcial impact assessment
found were likely to be only marginally affected by stan-
dardised packaging46—and general business and civil
society groups—who had no direct ﬁnancial interest in
the outcome of the conﬂict. The high proportion of
opposition organisations that received ﬁnancial subsidies
from TTCs highlights the power of industry money to
induce and augment political action.148–151 Membership
subscriptions and other long-term ﬁnancial subsidies to
organisations create a form of latent political capital that
can be drawn on in the context of speciﬁc health policy
conﬂicts. Industry funds research to underpin and argu-
ably enhance the legitimacy of public communications
and lobbying.106 152–154 Direct campaign subsidies lower
the costs of political activity, and increase the range of
politically important constituencies that can be effectively
targeted and mobilised by industry arguments.155 156
These ﬁndings illustrate the importance of third
parties to TTCs’ insider and outsider political strategies41 42
as they adapt to both Article 5.3 of the FCTC35 36 and to
Better Regulation.37 With regard to insider political strat-
egies, TTC ﬁnancial and in-kind support for third party
policy-facing activities (direct lobbying, research produc-
tion) is instrumental in off-setting government commit-
ments under Article 5.3 to reduce tobacco industry
access to policymakers. This is consistent with research
which uncovered extensive third party industry lobbying
Figure 4 Timing of opposition political activity 2011–2013, n=376 (excludes 14 mass recruitment campaigns which occurred
over a series of months and 14 research reports which were published between 2008 and 2010 but were subsequently used by
conflict participants between 2011 and 2013).
10 Hatchard JL, et al. BMJ Open 2016;6:e012634. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2016-012634
Open Access
group.bmj.com on November 7, 2016 - Published by http://bmjopen.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
against the European Union Tobacco Products
Directive.145 157 Subsidising research production also
optimises TTCs’ opportunities to capitalise on the
importance of evidence in shaping mandatory impact
assessments.54 55
Subsidising public-facing third party activities (mass
recruitment, public communication, research promo-
tion) was central to the industry’s outsider strategy. These
activities aimed to expand the conﬂict by mobilising spe-
ciﬁc constituencies and the general public against stan-
dardised packaging at key points within the policy
process. For example, TTC funding of mass recruitment
campaigns during the 2012 consultation produced 98%
of submissions objecting to the policy.3 The absence of
an immediately observable link between these active
third party activities and the industry is likely to have
been instrumental in their effectiveness,54 helping to
create an impression of strong opposition to the policy
from a wider range of constituencies. This is consistent
with efforts by active opponents of standardised pack-
aging to present the consultation as a referendum on
the policy,158 despite the wealth of supportive evi-
dence,18 26 the support of the majority of MPs50 159 and
opinion polls showing that only 11% of the general
public opposed the measure.160 161 This practice repre-
sents a highly public way of formally registering dissent
to policy proposals38 145 157 162 and presents further evi-
dence of industry adaptation to the opportunities for
inﬂuence inherent within Better Regulation processes.
The unique contribution of the study lies in the
innovative combination of publicly available sources and
investigative research techniques, which facilitates ana-
lysis of both the scale of political action in contemporary
health policy conﬂicts and the degree of support pro-
vided by the tobacco industry. By making explicit the
links between ostensibly independent organisations
opposing tobacco policy and TTCs, the research aims to
reduce the utility of their third party strategy for oppos-
ing public health policies. Further innovation comes
from the systematic classiﬁcation of the sector and rela-
tionships of actors engaged in political activity, which
enables the examination of relationships between osten-
sibly distinct groups opposing public health policy. This
is a novel system which could be applied to increase
understanding of how corporations in other sectors
responsible for producing commodities harmful to
health (eg, alcohol, sugar-sweetened beverages) oppose
population level policy instruments. By outlining the
relationships between TTCs and other organisations in
the conﬂict around standardised packaging and
mapping these relationships to political actions, the
study builds on the political science literature which pri-
marily focuses on the role of civil society groups in
expanding policy conﬂicts and understates the role of
ﬁnancial subsidies to conﬂict participants.38 57 162–167
The ﬁndings complement research examining tobacco
industry arguments, strategies and tactics used in
Australia to oppose standardised packaging.168
The ongoing nature of the policy process during the
study period limited access to key sources of data.
Ofﬁcials from the Department of Health declined
requests for interview. Some FOI requests were declined
under section 35 of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), which exempts the release of information relat-
ing to ‘the formulation or development of government
policy’169 170 and the Regulatory Policy Committee (a key
organisation responsible for approving impact assess-
ments40) is not covered by FOIA.171 The practical
requirements of data volume led to the exclusion of
social media data from the study. It is thus possible that
the volume of tobacco industry-supported activity and
the extent and nature of relationships between TTCs and
third parties were greater than is revealed by the study.
Supplementary research using social network and social
media analysis would provide deeper insights into how
protobacco policy networks are formed and operate.
Our ﬁndings have major policy implications of rele-
vance to parties to the FCTC and to countries where
Better Regulation processes are integral to the policy
process. First, and most importantly, the high incidence
of ﬁnancial relationships between tobacco manufac-
turers and third party opponents highlights the need for
all policymakers, and the media,172 to treat organisations
in tobacco policy conﬂicts with scepticism and to rou-
tinely require declarations of ﬁnancial relationships in
all interactions. To strengthen implementation of Article
5.3 of the FCTC, governance reforms should be intro-
duced to require: (1) regular reports from TTCs on
their afﬁliations, political activities and associated
expenditure; and (2) the establishment of a transparent
system of disclosure, through which all non-tobacco
industry organisations lobbying any part of government
on tobacco control must always disclose core funding,
donations and membership fees from TTCs.
In addition, evidence of government-wide lobbying
underlines the importance of health ofﬁcials raising
awareness and sharing information with other govern-
ment departments regarding industry interference in
public policy in accordance with the guidelines for
implementation of Article 5.3.35 The scale and complex-
ity of relationships between TTCs and other organisa-
tions engaged in tobacco policy conﬂicts reafﬁrms the
importance of industry monitoring.173 174 Finally, the
timing and scale of industry-funded research, which,
ultimately, feeds into stakeholder consultations and
impact assessments,44 highlights the importance of con-
tinued funding of policy-relevant research by public and
third sector organisations.
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